The modern struggle of moralities has nearly always been couched in terms of a conflict between relativist and absolutist moralities - the former, in its most modern incarnation, as "multiculturalism," and the latter as traditional (typically religious) institutions of morality. The former recognizes no absolute truth in a moral sense; the latter insists upon the existence of an absolute. This debate is not new, by any means, but has been recast in new terms by the emergence of the modern multicultural movement, with its emphasis on cultural moralities, as well as the traditionally relativist emphasis on personal definitions of truth. Accompanying the reemergence of the relativist philosophies has been a growth in utilitarianism (typically combined with secular humanism) unparalleled since the early parts of the twentieth century. This latter moral framework - utilitarianism - is often overlooked in the ongoing debate about truth at this intersection of history. In many ways, this makes sense, for the simple yet obvious reason that utilitarianism is not, in and of itself, a fundamental philosophy. It makes no claim about the nature of reality, only what we ought to do when that argument is settled.
Utilitarianism argues, at least on its simplest level, that we ought to do whatever action causes the greatest good down the line - even if that action here in the moment would ordinarily be considered evil by any system of measurement. As such, it is a philosophical construct layered onto the top of an absolute or a relative system of morality. The difficulty arises in that, while "no more" than a construct on top of either absolutist or relativist systems, utilitarianism has effects far beyond those of most other additions to such systems, in that it actually realigns the morality of either system and thus creates its own system of morality. We will begin with a critical examination of utilitarianism in the context of an absolute moral framework, then move on and examine its role in a relative moral framework.
When operating in an absolutist framework, utilitarianism is a construct which purports to redefine, or perhaps simply realign, the hierarchy of good and evil actions. Because the framework itself is absolute, utilitarianism functions essentially as a subjective modifier to the rankings of good and evil actions. By introducing an alternate hierarchical structure to the absolute construct, utilitarianism actually introduces a relativist bias. A Biblical moral structure has clearly delineated lines of good and evil, allowing for context dependent variations and taking into account a plethora of situations whose varied nature requires different rewards and/or punishments. And this is in the Old Testament alone, before the establishment of a covenant of grace. The Levitical law is extremely clear on what is good, what is evil, and what the punishments and atonements necessitated by evil are. Jesus' coming did not in the least change this; quite the contrary: by providing an example of the law fulfilled, He demonstrated perfect good and raised the bar for all who would follow Him. What utilitarianism does is take this clearly delineated set of guidelines for what is right and what is wrong, and postulate that the definitions of right and wrong need to be realigned. Rather than each action being right or wrong in a given context, regardless of the ultimate outcome, the intent of the person committing the deed and the ultimate consequences of the action take become the ultimate. Rape, murder, etc. may all be acceptable so long as the end goal is a net gain for society - and so long as that goal is actually achieved by the undertaking of those actions. Thus, the entire idea of an absolutist framework is undermined by the notion that, rather than having some absolute value of good and evil, any action's value is determined only by its net result. The outcome of this alteration to any absolute moral structure - Biblical or otherwise - is the net abolition of the absolutes and a shift to an essentially relativist structure, wherein deeds are good and bad only dependent on their context and the beliefs of the person committing them. The dichotomy between this personal relativism and the concept of an inherent, abstracted, and fundamental moral reality ultimately renders any attempt to reconcile absolutism with utilitarianism a failure at a purely logical level. The two are simply not compatible.
It is also this lattermost point which distinguishes the (inherently unworkable) addition of utilitarianism to absolutism from the thoroughly wieldy combination of utilitarianism with relativistic morality - its natural cousin (if not twin brother!) in moral philosophy. Relativism argues from the outset that any action may be judged moral or immoral only in the context of the reigning worldview or paradigm of the culture in which the actions are taking (in its least extreme form as so-called multiculturalism); or more extremely (but more essentially in line with the logical necessities of the framework), that an action's morality can be judged only by the person actually committing the act. That is, what is right for you may be wrong for me, but neither of us are actually correct about the particular deed being right or wrong. The difficulties with moral relativism are sufficient to warrant several posts of great length, but in short, the system breaks down any time it encounters a real-world situation. Typically, relativists modify their ideologies with certain absolutes, and without apparent cause; e.g. arguing that the only absolute is that what one does may not hurt another person or cause them harm. Yet this first encounters the difficulty of establishing why that is an absolute, and no other principle may be taken as such. There is no possible answer, because the existence of even one absolute must be explained, and further it allows for the possibility of other absolutes; and the existence of even a single absolute negates the fundamental premise of relativism. (Note, too, that the most basic statement of relativism, that is, "All moral views are equally true; no one has more validity than any other," is in and of itself a statement of moral truth claiming to have greater validity than any other. The system is fundamentally flawed.)
With all this for context, it should be reasonably clear how easily a utilitarian framework meshes with a relativist ideology. Given that relativism already holds that any action is subject to the judgment only of the person committing the deed, utilitarianism's requirement that the deed be committed for the "greater good" is really no constraint at all. Indeed, with no notable exceptions, even the most barbaric tyrants and murderers consider themselves fundamentally good. Hitler and Stalin certainly felt they were bettering society in some way by means of the purges they undertook. Moreover, they were sociopaths at a level such that their killing of millions had no discernible impact on them. From a conjunction of relativism and utilitarianism, it is hard to argue that either of them, particularly the ideologically motivated Hitler, was wrong in any sense to undertake the atrocities he committed. If all deeds are to be judged only by the intent of the one doing them, and if the morality of an action is to be understood as the combination of whether a net increase in good was actually accomplished, then by definition any action undertaken by any person will be good. The very concept of evil is effectively eliminated. Let us take again the example of Hitler: had he achieved his goal of eradicating all Jews and conquering the world for the glory of Germany and the spread of his perfect race, a person arguing honestly from a utilitarianist-modification of relativism would have to admit that he had achieved a good thing. Why? Because he believed wholeheartedly that the best outcome possible was the dominance of Aryans and the ultimate eradication of the Jews. For him, that was good. Therefore, if we hold utilitarian relativism as our view, we must admit that as a good goal.
Here is where things become even more disturbing: no matter how despicable the act may seem to be in and of itself, it may be carried through if necessary, according to utilitarianists. The even more troubling point is this: they would argue that seemingly wrong actions not only are allowable, but that if circumstance dictates, they become necessary. What does that circumstance look like? For those who carry utilitarianism to its logical conclusion (cf. Peter Singer, of Princeton University's Bioethics Department), whatever results in a net increase in happiness in the world is not only acceptable, not only admirable, but required. Combine this with relativism, and you have a world in which Hitler's deeds are not only justifiably allowable, they are fundamentally necessary - he had to murder millions to be in good conscience.
The notion is, of course, thoroughly revolting. Utilitarianism leads, quite to the contrary of the claims of those who advocate it as the best and most functional system of morality, to greater acceptance of evil, regardless of the underlying premise's relativism or absolutism. In essence, it subjectivizes the concept of good and evil, and in so doing effectively eliminates the possibility of evil actually existing. That it does we can clearly observe in the world around us, and so we are left with a choice. We may reject the notion of evil (again, turning to relativism) and instead accept that all deeds are simply people doing what they think will best increase their own happiness (and thus increase the net happiness of the world a bit) or benefit the world - no matter how horrid the deed is: the rapist must be allowed his enjoyment. Alternatively, we may reject utilitarianism and retain our concept of good and evil. The former choice is appealing to many nihilist philosophers, but so long as we maintain that existences is something more than the ultimately meaningless void that nihilism calls it, we must, if in the grip of reason, deny it.
Ultimately, we must reject utilitarianism not only on these philosophical grounds, though those are certainly sufficient, but also because of its inherent rejection of both God's concept of justice and His sovereignty. In ignoring the latter, it assumes that whenever the ultimate good prevails, the actions taken along the way were justified so long as they helped achieve that in some way. Christian doctrine, however, points out that God can take that which man meant for evil and work it for good nevertheless. And like nearly every other secular philosophy, utilitarianism is intentionally blind to God's justice, for the promise of ultimate accountability is anathema to the person who has rejected God in favor of their own personal autonomy. And in the end, utilitarianism - like relativism - is just man once again grasping at the straw of absolute personal autonomy. As always, he is doomed to failure.
Utilitarianism argues, at least on its simplest level, that we ought to do whatever action causes the greatest good down the line - even if that action here in the moment would ordinarily be considered evil by any system of measurement. As such, it is a philosophical construct layered onto the top of an absolute or a relative system of morality. The difficulty arises in that, while "no more" than a construct on top of either absolutist or relativist systems, utilitarianism has effects far beyond those of most other additions to such systems, in that it actually realigns the morality of either system and thus creates its own system of morality. We will begin with a critical examination of utilitarianism in the context of an absolute moral framework, then move on and examine its role in a relative moral framework.
When operating in an absolutist framework, utilitarianism is a construct which purports to redefine, or perhaps simply realign, the hierarchy of good and evil actions. Because the framework itself is absolute, utilitarianism functions essentially as a subjective modifier to the rankings of good and evil actions. By introducing an alternate hierarchical structure to the absolute construct, utilitarianism actually introduces a relativist bias. A Biblical moral structure has clearly delineated lines of good and evil, allowing for context dependent variations and taking into account a plethora of situations whose varied nature requires different rewards and/or punishments. And this is in the Old Testament alone, before the establishment of a covenant of grace. The Levitical law is extremely clear on what is good, what is evil, and what the punishments and atonements necessitated by evil are. Jesus' coming did not in the least change this; quite the contrary: by providing an example of the law fulfilled, He demonstrated perfect good and raised the bar for all who would follow Him. What utilitarianism does is take this clearly delineated set of guidelines for what is right and what is wrong, and postulate that the definitions of right and wrong need to be realigned. Rather than each action being right or wrong in a given context, regardless of the ultimate outcome, the intent of the person committing the deed and the ultimate consequences of the action take become the ultimate. Rape, murder, etc. may all be acceptable so long as the end goal is a net gain for society - and so long as that goal is actually achieved by the undertaking of those actions. Thus, the entire idea of an absolutist framework is undermined by the notion that, rather than having some absolute value of good and evil, any action's value is determined only by its net result. The outcome of this alteration to any absolute moral structure - Biblical or otherwise - is the net abolition of the absolutes and a shift to an essentially relativist structure, wherein deeds are good and bad only dependent on their context and the beliefs of the person committing them. The dichotomy between this personal relativism and the concept of an inherent, abstracted, and fundamental moral reality ultimately renders any attempt to reconcile absolutism with utilitarianism a failure at a purely logical level. The two are simply not compatible.
It is also this lattermost point which distinguishes the (inherently unworkable) addition of utilitarianism to absolutism from the thoroughly wieldy combination of utilitarianism with relativistic morality - its natural cousin (if not twin brother!) in moral philosophy. Relativism argues from the outset that any action may be judged moral or immoral only in the context of the reigning worldview or paradigm of the culture in which the actions are taking (in its least extreme form as so-called multiculturalism); or more extremely (but more essentially in line with the logical necessities of the framework), that an action's morality can be judged only by the person actually committing the act. That is, what is right for you may be wrong for me, but neither of us are actually correct about the particular deed being right or wrong. The difficulties with moral relativism are sufficient to warrant several posts of great length, but in short, the system breaks down any time it encounters a real-world situation. Typically, relativists modify their ideologies with certain absolutes, and without apparent cause; e.g. arguing that the only absolute is that what one does may not hurt another person or cause them harm. Yet this first encounters the difficulty of establishing why that is an absolute, and no other principle may be taken as such. There is no possible answer, because the existence of even one absolute must be explained, and further it allows for the possibility of other absolutes; and the existence of even a single absolute negates the fundamental premise of relativism. (Note, too, that the most basic statement of relativism, that is, "All moral views are equally true; no one has more validity than any other," is in and of itself a statement of moral truth claiming to have greater validity than any other. The system is fundamentally flawed.)
With all this for context, it should be reasonably clear how easily a utilitarian framework meshes with a relativist ideology. Given that relativism already holds that any action is subject to the judgment only of the person committing the deed, utilitarianism's requirement that the deed be committed for the "greater good" is really no constraint at all. Indeed, with no notable exceptions, even the most barbaric tyrants and murderers consider themselves fundamentally good. Hitler and Stalin certainly felt they were bettering society in some way by means of the purges they undertook. Moreover, they were sociopaths at a level such that their killing of millions had no discernible impact on them. From a conjunction of relativism and utilitarianism, it is hard to argue that either of them, particularly the ideologically motivated Hitler, was wrong in any sense to undertake the atrocities he committed. If all deeds are to be judged only by the intent of the one doing them, and if the morality of an action is to be understood as the combination of whether a net increase in good was actually accomplished, then by definition any action undertaken by any person will be good. The very concept of evil is effectively eliminated. Let us take again the example of Hitler: had he achieved his goal of eradicating all Jews and conquering the world for the glory of Germany and the spread of his perfect race, a person arguing honestly from a utilitarianist-modification of relativism would have to admit that he had achieved a good thing. Why? Because he believed wholeheartedly that the best outcome possible was the dominance of Aryans and the ultimate eradication of the Jews. For him, that was good. Therefore, if we hold utilitarian relativism as our view, we must admit that as a good goal.
Here is where things become even more disturbing: no matter how despicable the act may seem to be in and of itself, it may be carried through if necessary, according to utilitarianists. The even more troubling point is this: they would argue that seemingly wrong actions not only are allowable, but that if circumstance dictates, they become necessary. What does that circumstance look like? For those who carry utilitarianism to its logical conclusion (cf. Peter Singer, of Princeton University's Bioethics Department), whatever results in a net increase in happiness in the world is not only acceptable, not only admirable, but required. Combine this with relativism, and you have a world in which Hitler's deeds are not only justifiably allowable, they are fundamentally necessary - he had to murder millions to be in good conscience.
The notion is, of course, thoroughly revolting. Utilitarianism leads, quite to the contrary of the claims of those who advocate it as the best and most functional system of morality, to greater acceptance of evil, regardless of the underlying premise's relativism or absolutism. In essence, it subjectivizes the concept of good and evil, and in so doing effectively eliminates the possibility of evil actually existing. That it does we can clearly observe in the world around us, and so we are left with a choice. We may reject the notion of evil (again, turning to relativism) and instead accept that all deeds are simply people doing what they think will best increase their own happiness (and thus increase the net happiness of the world a bit) or benefit the world - no matter how horrid the deed is: the rapist must be allowed his enjoyment. Alternatively, we may reject utilitarianism and retain our concept of good and evil. The former choice is appealing to many nihilist philosophers, but so long as we maintain that existences is something more than the ultimately meaningless void that nihilism calls it, we must, if in the grip of reason, deny it.
Ultimately, we must reject utilitarianism not only on these philosophical grounds, though those are certainly sufficient, but also because of its inherent rejection of both God's concept of justice and His sovereignty. In ignoring the latter, it assumes that whenever the ultimate good prevails, the actions taken along the way were justified so long as they helped achieve that in some way. Christian doctrine, however, points out that God can take that which man meant for evil and work it for good nevertheless. And like nearly every other secular philosophy, utilitarianism is intentionally blind to God's justice, for the promise of ultimate accountability is anathema to the person who has rejected God in favor of their own personal autonomy. And in the end, utilitarianism - like relativism - is just man once again grasping at the straw of absolute personal autonomy. As always, he is doomed to failure.

